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Annual Review of Political Science

Volume 26, 2023

Democracy and the Corporation: The Long View

Abstract

There is an unexamined paradox in the history of government in the West. The so-called absolutist monarchs of Europe overwhelmingly chartered republican corporations—e.g., towns, universities, and guilds whose members elected their leaders. Indeed, modern constitutional democracy is patterned after them. Yet, modern democracies themselves have overwhelmingly chartered authoritarian corporations—e.g., universities and business corporations whose subjects have no vote. After this Great Inversion, corporations, which once distributed power and wealth, now concentrate them, straining constitutional democracy. Against this backdrop, this article analyzes the major types of relation maintained between states and corporations: constitutive (states charter corporations), mimetic (states and corporations recurrently copy one another's organizational features), and instrumental (each leans on the other, and sometimes captures it, to better advance its own purposes). The article then examines the special challenges that corporate economies pose to constitutional democracy and considers whether a partial reversal of the Great Inversion could reduce them.

Keyword(s): constitutionalism, corporation, democracy, enterprise foundation, inequality, republicanism
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2023-06-15
2024-06-11
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